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ABSTRACT 
In Bangladesh—one of the poorest countries in Asia, where rice accounts for almost 70 percent of 
consumers’ caloric intake—the share of the less expensive, low-quality  coarse rice is shown to be rapidly 
decreasing in rice markets and the quality premium for the best-quality  rice has been consistently  on the 
rise in the last decades. It thus seems that the role of rice as only  a cheap staple food is being redefined. 
The off-farm share in the final  consumer price increases from 27 percent to 35 percent to 48 percent for 
low-, medium-,  and high-quality  rice, respectively, and the increasing demand for higher quality is thus 
seemingly associated with a more important off-farm food sector—in  particular, milling, retailing, and 
branding—as well as a transformed milling  industry.  We further find  that the labor rewards for and the 
technical efficiency of growing different rice qualities  are not significantly  different, and farmers do not 
benefit directly from consumers’ increased willingness  to pay for higher rice quality. 
Keywords:  Bangladesh, rice, markets, value chains, Asia, quality, milling 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Food value chains are being transformed worldwide, given changing consumption patterns and the 
increasing insistence on food quality  and safety (World Bank 2007). These changes are also happening  in 
a number of developing  countries (see, for example, Swinnen 2007; Jaffee and Henson 2004; Orden and 
Roberts 2007; Unnevehr 2007; World Bank 2007; Reardon and Timmer 2007), and more in particular in 
Asia (Pingali 2007; Minten, Reardon, and Chen 2011; Mergenthaler, Weinberger, and Qaim 2009). 
However, despite the presumed importance of the transformation of food systems of developing 
countries, there are currently still  relatively  few good data and analyses of its magnitude and impacts. 
Three strands of research on the transformation  of food systems in developing  countries can be 
distinguished  in the recent literature. First, new evidence is emerging on the increasing demand for food 
quality by the poor (for example, Banerjee and Duflo 2011). While economic theory would predict an 
increase in a demand for the cheapest calories when calorie-insufficient  households are given a choice, 
new research shows that even the poor increasingly  seem to prefer food quality  and taste over quantity 
(Jensen and Miller  2008; Deaton and Drèze 2009). This change in preference may be driven by the 
decline of heavy physical work, improvement in transportation, increasing availability  of motorized mills, 
and better access to water and sanitation,  factors that could possibly  contribute to lower energy 
requirements and more modest productivity  gains from higher calorie consumption (Banerjee and Duflo 
2011). 
Second, a number of authors have looked empirically  at the influence  of new food safety and 
quality  requirements on poor small producers, mostly  because of the emergence of new commercial 
channels such as export agriculture or supermarkets (Reardon et al. 2009; Jaffee, Henson, and Rios 2011). 
For example, different institutional  models are emerging that successfully address these requirements, 
including  contract farming (Miyata, Minot, and Hu 2009; Minten, Randrianarison, and Swinnen 2009) 
and vertical integration (for example, Swinnen 2007; Birthal, Joshi, and Gulati 2005). A significant body 
of research now exists that looks  at income and welfare effects of these changes on producers (for 
example, Rao and Qaim 2011;  Maertens and Swinnen 2009; Miyata, Minot,  and Hu 2009; Neven et al. 
2009). A common characteristic of this research is that it has largely  focused on nonstaple crops, rather 
than staples such as rice and wheat, and on the emergence of new market channels. 
Third,  research has been done on the distribution  of the gains within  value chains from this 
transformation because it is not well understood who actually benefits from the higher prices that 
consumers are willing  to pay for safe, high-quality  products (for example, Swinnen and Vandeplas 2010). 
Some argue that midstream companies might extract the surplus through  their bargaining  power within 
the chain (for example, Unnevehr 2000; Warning and Key 2002) while others have argued that improved 
quality standards might actually reduce transaction costs in trade and thus lead to benefits for suppliers 
(Henson and Jaffee 2007). Research in this area has, however, been largely  theoretical (for example, 
Swinnen and Vandeplas 2010). 
In this paper, we contribute to the literature in this area in three ways. First, we analyze data from 
innovative surveys  we implemented at different levels in the rice value chain, from rural producer to 
urban consumer, in Bangladesh. In these surveys, we make a clear distinction  in food quality 
characteristics throughout  the value chain. Such simultaneous  surveys at different levels in the value 
chain have rarely been fielded,1 and this survey is the first for staples in traditional  as well as modern 
value chains in developing  countries. Second, in Bangladesh, one of the poorest countries in Asia, where 
rice consumption per capita is one of the highest of the world, we find an important change in quality in 
the rice market. In particular,  we note an important  decline of the less expensive, lowest-quality rice, 
coarse rice, in  the past decade. We further find a doubling  of the quality premium for the  best-quality rice 
over the past three decades. It thus seems that the role of rice as only  a cheap staple food is being 
redefined, even in these poor settings. Third, we find that the producer share in final retail prices drops to 
                                                 
1 Notable exceptions are Fafchamps, Vargas  Hill, and Minten (2008), and Fafchamps and Vargas  Hill (2008).  
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half for the best-quality  rice from almost three-quarters for the lower-quality  one. Especially  retailers and 
millers seem to capture most of the quality premium between farmers and urban consumers, while there 
are no large price differences at the farm level. The increasing demand for food quality in these settings 
thus seems to lead to the emergence of a more important off-farm food sector. Seemingly  associated with 
the rise in  quality,  we further find significant  changes in the milling  sector in the areas surveyed. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. We first present some background information  on the rice 
sector in Bangladesh in Section 2. Section 3 describes the data and methodology  used. In Section 4, basic 
descriptive statistics from the primary surveys are presented. Section 5 looks  at rice quality  downstream 
in urban retail markets while Section 6 studies it upstream, at the farm level. Section 7 then explores who 
benefits from the increasing willingness  to pay for rice quality in the value chain. We finish  with 
conclusions in Section 8. 
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2.  RICE IN BANGLADESH 
The agricultural  economy of Bangladesh is heavily dependent on rice. It is estimated that almost three-
quarters of total cropped land in Bangladesh is devoted to paddy cultivation,  and per capita rice 
consumption is one of the highest in the world. Based on national surveys, foodgrain consumption for an 
average person in urban and rural areas in Bangladesh is shown to have stabilized  over time at about 160 
and 180 kilograms per person per year, respectively (Bangladesh, Bureau of Statistics 2005). Rice is the 
main foodgrain product (wheat makes up only 2 percent of total foodgrain consumption  for urban 
consumers, 6 percent rural), and it is estimated that rice expenditures make up 40 percent of total food 
expenditures. Rice contributes more than 63 percent and 71 percent of the caloric intake of urban and 
rural consumers, respectively. It is important in the consumption  basket of poor and rich alike: The 
poorest quintile  consumes 139 and 146 kilograms of rice per capita in urban and rural areas, respectively 
(Bangladesh, Bureau of Statistics 2005). 
Significant changes have happened to rice cultivation in Bangladesh over time. While rice 
acreage has changed little  in the past decades, there have, however, been changes in the relative 
importance of different seasons. Rice is grown in three seasons in Bangladesh: the part rainfed, part dry 
aman season (harvest in December–January); the dry boro period, when crops are irrigated (harvest in 
April–May); and the rainfed aus season (harvest in August–September). Aman acreage has changed little 
over time, but boro acreage has increased substantially and aus acreage has declined accordingly. This 
has also led to changes in seasonal price patterns of rice (Murshid et al. 2009). Production of rice overall 
has increased significantly  over the last 40 years. Due to the proliferation  of shallow tube wells and the 
development of high-yielding dry-season rice varieties (boro rice), rice yields  have increased dramatically 
and the share of dry-season rice has increased from 10 percent of the country’s rice production  in 1966/67 
to 61 percent in 2008 (Hossain 2009). 
The success in the increase of rice production  is strongly  related to the release and wide adoption 
of different high-yielding  varieties (HYV) in recent decades (Hossain, Bose, and Mustafi 2006). In the 
1970s and 1980s, these HYV used genetic material from the Philippines  and were mostly focused on 
coarse grains. While  the earlier generation lacked disease resistance, this changed with newer varieties 
released in the 1980s. The second-generation varieties that have been introduced  since the mid-1990s 
have used other international  genetic material and focused on shorter plant heights (for example, BRRI 
dhan 28, BRRI dhan 29). They were rapidly adopted because of high yields,  shorter maturity,  and 
relatively good grain quality,  causing a shift away from coarse rice varieties (Hossain, Bose, and Mustafi 
2006). 
An important factor in any food market is quality. While the quality of rice is judged by a number 
of factors, such as physical appearance (for example, size of the grain as measured by the ratio of length 
to width),  transparency, milling,  cooking  and processing, and nutritional  quality,  these are difficult to 
measure objectively (Rahman 2004). The most widespread distinction  used in the rice sector in 
Bangladesh relates to the shape and size of the kernel. The coarser the grain, the wider or fatter it is 
(relative to the length). Coarse rice grains used in Bangladesh have a width of more than 2 millimeters. 
This compares with 1.7 to 2.0 millimeters  for medium rice and less than 1.7 millimeters  for fine rice 
(Rahman 2004). This distinction  between fine, medium,  and coarse rice grains is widely  used and well 
known by farmers as well as traders, and we will  therefore use it as a measure for quality  throughout  this 
paper. While good statistics are lacking on the economic importance of the three qualities,  fine rice is 
seemingly  the least important  of the three at the national level. It was estimated in 2002 that fine rice 
made up about 10 percent of the land allocated to rice cultivation  (International Development Enterprises 
2002) while the World Bank (2008) evaluated the importance of fine rice in total rice production at 5 
percent.  
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3.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of the study is to understand how quality  impacts the rice value chain in Bangladesh from 
rural areas to the capital, Dhaka, which, along with its metropolitan area, is home to approximately13 
million  people. To get at this information,  two types of activities were organized. Interviews were 
conducted with key informants in the value chain in October 2009. That information  was used to design 
questionnaires for each level in the value chain. These questionnaires were then fielded  at the end of 2009 
(November and December). The implemented  instruments included  surveys upstream in the supply chain 
with rice-producing households and villages, midstream with wholesalers and millers,  and downstream 
with retailers. 
Upstream in the supply  chain, the district of Noagoan was selected to represent rural production 
areas because it is an important rice-producing district,  supplying  rice to the capital. The district is located 
about 200 kilometers north of Dhaka. The village  and household  survey was set up as follows. The two 
most important paddy-producing  thana (subdistricts) in the district of Noagoan were selected. In each 
thana, the villages were stratified based on total rice produced in the village.  Then five villages from each 
thana were randomly selected—two from the stratum of high-producing  villages,  two from the stratum of 
medium-producing  villages,  and one from the stratum of low-producing  villages.  In each selected village, 
a village  questionnaire was implemented  and a census of households  was conducted to enumerate the 
paddy producers. From each of the selected villages,  22 paddy-producing  households  were then randomly 
selected, half from the group with the largest farms and half from the group with the smallest farms, 
reflecting their respective share in the rice value chain. Thus, 220 paddy-farming households were 
selected in total.
2 A survey focusing on rice production  and marketing  practices was then implemented. 
Midstream in the supply chain, the wholesaler survey was set up as follows.  First, interviews 
were conducted with village  traders and other rural off-wholesale-market traders who buy from 
households in that village  or from other traders (17 in total). Second, 43 traders were interviewed from the 
local rural wholesale market in the selected district. Third,  30 urban wholesale traders were interviewed in 
Dhaka, half from each of the two most important rice wholesale markets in the city, Badamtoli and Krishi 
markets. These traders were randomly selected after a census was done. 
Also in midstream,  a list  of all  the millers  in the district  of Noagoan was obtained. A stratified 
random selection of 20 millers was done (8 with automatic mills,  5 with semiautomatic mills,  and 7 with 
small mills)3  and detailed surveys were conducted, focusing on information  related to purchases, sales, 
and milling  patterns. These different technology strata for mills  were selected given the presumed 
importance in the production  of better-quality rice by the larger mills,  which are usually  automatic or 
semiautomatic. For example, Murshid (2011) found that the increasing availability  and affordability of 
better-quality  rice in the market has become possible  because of the increasing availability  and use of 
modernized mills. 
Downstream in the supply  chain, a retail survey was conducted in  Dhaka, covering both 
traditional  and modern retailers. First, five thana were randomly selected in different parts of Dhaka 
(north, east, west, south, and central). In each thana, a census was done of all retail markets, and two 
markets were randomly selected. A census of all rice retailers was done for each market, and 12 traders 
                                                 
2 While the survey was set up to be representative at the retail level in Dhaka, the necessary resources were lacking to do 
this at the producer level. Thus, the quantitative results related to the role of the farmer and the structure of the value chain reflect 
only the situation for production zones similar to the one studied—that is, located about 200 kilometers from Dhaka. Results 
might be indicative, but will be different in practice, for rice production areas closer to or further away from Dhaka. 
3 Small mills typically first parboil rice and then spread it to dry in the open air. After drying, the rice is transferred to be 
milled by small Engelberg friction hullers, which remove the husk and polish the rice all in one unit (Chowdhury and Haggblade 
2000). Semiautomatic mills are characterized by larger hullers with rubber rollers (Rahman 2004). Large-scale  automatic mills 
emerged  in the 1980s, mainly financed by donor money. These mills integrate steam-pressure parboiling, mechanical  forced-air 
dryers, rubber rollers for shelling, and polishing machines in a single conveyer-driven, flow-through facility (Chowdhury and 
Haggblade  2000).  
5 
were then randomly selected and interviewed. A total of 120 traditional  retailers were thus interviewed. 
Second, 20 surveys were conducted with modern retailers. In each thana that was selected for the 
traditional  retail survey, a census of modern retail stores was conducted and 4 were randomly selected.4 
A price survey was then also implemented  for both types of retailer. 
                                                 
4 Growth rates in supermarket stores are high, but the growth started from a low base. Our census revealed that at the end of 
2009, about 80 supermarket stores, almost all in Dhaka, were active in the country. There were only 4 such stores in 2001.  
6 
4.  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON THE RICE VALUE CHAIN 
Table 4.1 presents some descriptive statistics of the sample of rice value chain agents.
5 A total of 470 
interviews were conducted. The data show large variability  within  the chain, for example,  significant 
variation in capital requirements at different levels. Retailers are usually significantly  smaller than 
wholesalers, whose working capital and asset value are often 10 times as high. The biggest capital 
requirements in the value chain, however, occur in midstream processing—that is,  in the mills.  The 
product turnover of retailers is about 22 kilograms per day. This compares with 10 tons per day for the 
wholesalers and up to 50 tons per day per mill  (when working at full capacity). To put it in a different 
perspective, an urban retailer would need on average the sales of 1.5 farmers to assure his rice supplies for 
the year, whereas a wholesaler would  require the sales of 400 farmers and a mill  about 2,000  farmers. 
Table 4.1—Descriptive statistics 
   Unit  Mean  Median 
Upstream 
      Farmers 
      Number of observations  Number  220 
  Value of assets  BDT 1,000  2,213  1,550 
Paddy land cultivated  Acres  6  5 
Paddy production in previous year  Tons/year  10  9 
Paddy sales in previous year  Tons/year  7  4 
Paddy sales income  BDT 1,000  85  49 
Midstream 
      Mills 
      Number of observations  Number  20 
  Capacity of mill  Tons/day  51  37 
Value of mill  BDT 1,000  58,790  35,000 
Wholesalers 
      Number of observations  Number  90 
  Quantity procured daily  Tons/day  10  4 
Value of assets  BDT 1,000  1,033  49 
Working capital   BDT 1,000  2,432  1,000 
Downstream 
      Traditional retailers 
      Number of observations  Number  120 
  Quantity procured daily  kgs/day  22  16 
Value of assets  BDT 1,000  80  5 
Working capital   BDT 1,000  156  60 
Modern retailers 
      Number of observations  Number  20    
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
The total paddy area cultivated amounts to almost 6 acres per farming household  annually. 
However, since rice land is cultivated  two or even three times over the year, the yearly cultivated rice area 
                                                 
5 It is important to keep in mind that surveys of value chain actors were set up in a stratified way (with unweighted numbers 
presented here) and fielded in only one district supplying to the city. Caution is thus needed to extrapolate these numbers to the 
national level.  
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is significantly  higher  than the physical  area of 2.6 acres per household. Even though  we sampled farmers 
according to their share in the volume of paddy produced (and thus have a large number of bigger farmers 
compared with what a simple random selection of farmers would produce), this still relatively small area 
allocated to rice paddy reflects the overall small farm sizes and high population  density in rural 
Bangladesh. The numbers are consistent with overall statistics in Bangladesh, where it is estimated that 
almost 90 percent of the farmers cultivate fewer than 2.5 acres (about 1 hectare). The interviewed farmers 
produced on average about 10 tons of paddy in the year prior to the survey and sold 70 percent of it, 
accounting for a sales income of about 85,000 Bangladeshi taka (BDT) per household (about US$1,240),
6 
or BDT 18,850 per capita (about $275).
7 
Table 4.2 presents information  on rice quality handled by the different value chain agents and 
shows how quality  has evolved over time, based on recall questions asked of these different agents. Two 
observations can be made from the table. First,  we see in the past 10 years a large shift away from coarse 
rice to medium and fine rice in  the surveyed production  area. The share of coarse paddy in  total sales at 
the producer level  declined from 36 percent in 1999 to 17 percent in 2009. Similar  trends are seen at the 
upstream and midstream level,  but to a lesser extent, possibly  indicating  that this change was less 
pronounced in other production  areas than in the area surveyed. For example, urban wholesalers in Dhaka 
report that coarse rice represented 45 percent of total sales in  1999 and 28 percent in 2009, medium  rice 
37 percent in 1999 and 44 percent in 2009, and fine rice 18 percent in 1999 and 29 percent in 2009. For 
all value chain agents, shares of coarse rice have declined  significantly  as measured by a t-test—between 
11 percent and 22 percent over the 10-year period, depending on the value chain agent. The share of 
medium  rice has increased by between 3 percent and 17 percent, and all the changes are significant. 
While  we also see mostly significant  positive  trends for the share of fine rice, these increases are smaller 
than those for the rise of medium-quality rice. 
Table 4.2—Change in the importance of different rice qualities in the rice value chain in the last 
decade 
 
% in sales  t-test difference 
 
Year  Mean 
     1999  2009  difference  t-value  Pr(T>t) 
Coarse 
          Producer  36  17  -19  -10.58  0.00 
Rural wholesaler off-market  47  31  -16  -4.55  0.00 
Rural wholesaler on-market  55  33  -22  -5.74  0.00 
Mill  49  34  -15  -4.16  0.00 
Urban wholesaler Dhaka  45  28  -17  -7.39  0.00 
Urban retailer Dhaka  34  23  -11  -7.90  0.00 
Medium 
   
  
    Producer  45  62  17  8.52  0.00 
Rural wholesaler off-market  41  56  15  5.20  0.00 
Rural wholesaler on-market  29  39  10  3.63  0.00 
Mill  27  39  12  2.80  0.01 
Urban wholesaler Dhaka  37  44  7  3.40  0.00 
Urban retailer Dhaka  35  38  3  2.69  0.01 
Fine 
   
  
    Producer  20  22  2  1.72  0.09 
Rural wholesaler off-market  12  13  1  0.34  0.73 
Rural wholesaler on-market  17  27  10  3.17  0.00 
Mill  24  27  3  0.73  0.47 
Urban wholesaler Dhaka  18  29  11  4.43  0.00 
Urban retailer Dhaka  31  39  8  5.47  0.00 
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
                                                 
6 All dollar amounts are in U.S. dollars. 
7 To put this into context, Bangladesh’s  gross domestic product per capita in 2009 was just below $700.   
8 
Second, the share of fine rice is estimated to be significantly  higher for Dhaka wholesalers and 
retailers than for other agents in the value chain.
8 This might reflect two phenomena. First, more fine rice 
is consumed in Dhaka than in the rest of the country, which is possible  because of the relative 
concentration of better-off consumers there and thus the higher demand for this more expensive rice 
quality. Second, some of the lower paddy quality  is possibly  transformed in the value chain into a higher-
quality rice, resulting in a relative increase in rice quality from rural traders to urban retailers. Some 
millers transform lower-quality  paddy into  a higher-quality  rice through extra milling  (as well as extra 
parboiling)  and through the use of polishing  machines.  
The change in quality in the rice market is seemingly associated with a transformation of the 
milling  sector, since automatic and semiautomatic mills are generally perceived to have higher quality 
standards as well as more reliable weighing  and bagging  procedures than do small mills  (Murshid 2011). 
The share of the small mills  in the trade of both farmers and rice wholesalers has declined, as reported by 
farmers and wholesalers in our survey, on average for fine rice from 70 percent to 26 percent, for medium 
rice from 69 percent to 43 percent, and for coarse rice from 68 percent to 40 percent in the past decade. 
The change exists for all three qualities but is especially stark for fine rice. Murshid (2011) reports similar 
findings  on the decline of the small mill  in two other major rice-producing  districts (Bogra and Noakhali) 
in Bangladesh.
9 
   
                                                 
8 However, Dhaka wholesalers sell significantly less fine rice than do Dhaka retailers. This is possibly partly the case 
because the former also sell to other parts of the country. 
9 However, the decline of the small mills is not yet reflected in official national statistics, possibly because government 
statistics are outdated. It was estimated by the Ministry of Food and Disaster Management that in 2006/07 there were 13,329 
small mills, 109 major rice mills, and 141 automatic rice mills in Bangladesh, accounting for 550,204 tons, 8,595 tons, and 
22,827 tons of milling  capacity respectively (FMPU 2009). The growing importance of hybrid rice has reportedly led to the 
increasing importance of automatic mills because the milling  quality of hybrid rice is poor in small and semiautomatic mills. 
Hybrid rice only started taking off in the middle  of the decade from 2000 to 2010 (Murshid 2011). Other reasons might be that 
small mills might be on the books of the government but not functioning anymore, and that this and Murshid’s study have 
focused on more dynamic districts in Bangladesh and the change might not yet have occurred to the same extent in other parts of 
the country. The numbers at the national level thus deserve more research.  
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5.  RICE QUALITY DOWNSTREAM IN THE VALUE CHAIN 
We first want to understand the quality  premium downstream before we see how the rewards for quality 
are transmitted to producers and the rest of the value chain in the next sections. We rely on two sources of 
information  to understand the rewards for rice quality  in retail markets in Dhaka. First, we use secondary 
information  on prices that have been collected over the past three decades by the Bangladeshi 
government. Second, we use price observations of a sample of traditional  as well as modern retailers on 
the day of our primary survey. 
The Quality Premium over Time 
Figure 5.1 shows the level and the evolution  of the rice price quality premium,  defined as a percentage 
ratio of fine and medium rice prices over coarse rice prices, based on prices that are collected monthly in 
the retail markets of Dhaka. There are three important observations from this graph. First, despite the 
widespread adoption  of medium-quality  rice in  Bangladesh in the past decade, there are still  important 
quality premiums remaining for that rice quality compared with coarse rice. Second, premiums for fine 
and medium rice show high correlations over time: When premiums for fine rice are high, those for 
medium rice are  also high. This might illustrate the relatively high substitutability  of these  rice  qualities. 
Third, the ratios show significant  variability  over time. The graph shows that price premiums were as high 
as 12 percent and 20 percent for medium and fine rice, respectively,  at the beginning  of the 1980s. The 
level of the fine rice premium was significantly  higher by 2009/10,  with a price premium of almost 45 
percent over coarse rice. While the rise in premiums for medium and fine rice were in sync until the 
beginning  of the 1990s, the gap between them has increased from then on, perhaps because of the 
increasing availability  and widespread adoption  of medium  rice varieties that has seemingly  held down 
the increase of the premium for medium-quality  rice over time. 
Figure 5.1—Percent rice quality premium, three-year moving averages 
 
Source:  Department of Marketing (DAM). 









































































































































































































































Quality and Traditional Retail 
In the fielded  primary survey, prices were asked for all  the products that the value chain agent was selling 
at the time of the survey (at the end of 2009). Based on these price data, we find average quality 
premiums in traditional  markets that are similar to the ones reported in the government-collected time 
series for that period. While  the average and median prices of coarse and medium  rice were BDT 26 per 
kilogram  and BDT 30 per kilogram,  respectively (or a quality  premium of 15 percent), the average price 
for fine rice was as high as BDT 44 per kilogram and the median price was as high as BDT 41 per 
kilogram  at the time of the survey—a quality  premium of 69 percent over coarse rice. 
We also find  that there is significant  price variation  across retailers at any point in time,  but 
different for the three qualities. This is shown in Figure 5.2, where the price variation of rice is plotted, 
through a cumulative  density function,  for each type of rice at the time of the survey. It seems that retail 
prices vary  significantly,  with variation primarily depending on quality. Variation for fine rice is 
significantly  higher than for other types of rice, with prices for fine rice varying from BDT 24 per 
kilogram  to more than BDT 80 per kilogram,  and more price observations in a broader domain are noted 
for fine rice, as shown by a less steep slope of the function. The cumulative density distribution  functions 
for coarse and medium rice, on the other hand, are much more tightly  centered than that of fine rice 
(Figure 5.2). We further note that the prices of fine and medium rice dominate stochastically at first order 
the prices of coarse rice over the whole domain,  indicating  the unambiguous  rewards for rice quality  in 
these markets. 
Figure 5.2—Cumulative density functions of traditional retail prices of rice 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
Quality and Modern Retail 
Modern retail is still a niche player in Bangladesh, but its importance is increasing rapidly (the total 
number of modern retail stores in Dhaka more than tripled  from 2006 to 2009), as seen elsewhere in Asia 
(Reardon, Timmer,  and Minten 2010). Modern retail often puts differently structured value chains in 
place that provide products of different prices and quality (Minten and Reardon 2008). To understand that 
niche, we compare prices and qualities of rice that are sold by modern and traditional  retail (Table 5.1). 
We asked retailers the different varieties that they were selling at the time of the survey and put them into  
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the three broad categories of coarse, medium, and fine. We also noted their prices. Modern retailers sell 
mostly a higher quality  of rice, since they sell no coarse rice; 2 percent of the rice on offer is medium rice 
while 98 percent is considered fine rice. For traditional  retailers, fine rice makes up only 50 percent of the 
portfolio  of rice they have on offer, while 28 percent is coarse rice and 23 percent is medium  rice. The 
higher share of fine rice in their portfolio  compared with their turnover (reported earlier in Table 4.2) 
seems to indicate higher turnover for coarse grains as well as a lower number of varieties or brands within 
the lower-quality category—these perceptions were confirmed in key informant interviews. In modern 
retail, 45 percent of the rice is sold packaged or branded, while this is rarely done in traditional retail (8 
percent of the products on offer). These data thus illustrate  overall the higher-quality portfolio of  the 
newly emerging supermarket segment. 
We further compare prices between these different market segments (bottom of Table 5.1). 
Average prices are significantly  higher in modern versus traditional  retail. Prices in modern retail are 
about BDT 16 per kilogram,  or 50 percent, higher and the difference is significant  as shown by a t-test. 
However, this simple  comparison does not take into  account the differences in quality  and other rice 
characteristics between the different outlets. When we control for these different characteristics—rice 
quality (coarse, medium, fine), variety, parboiling,  packaging, and thana (location) dummies—using a 
hedonic pricing model, this difference largely disappears. Modern retail prices are still  significantly 
higher than those in traditional  retail; ceteris paribus, it is estimated that rice prices in modern retail are 
BDT 1.78 per kilogram higher (a price difference of about 4 percent). In an overview of evidence on food 
price and quality between modern and traditional  market formats in a range of developing  countries, 
Minten and Reardon (2008) found that modern retail is usually more expensive in the early supermarket 
rollout,  when the stores tend to focus on the richer segment of the population.  This seems to be also the 
case for rice in Bangladesh. However, the price difference is surprisingly  low for this phase of 
supermarket rollout,  and the time savings for households  of one-stop shopping  at supermarkets versus 
going into congested traditional  retail markets might possibly make up for the price difference. 
Table 5.1—Price and quality comparisons of rice between modern and traditional retail 




       
Mean 
     Unit  Traditional  Modern  difference  t-value  Pr(T>t) 
Number of observations     755  190          
Quality differences 
            Coarse  %  28  0  -28 
    Medium  %  23  2  -21 
    Fine  %  50  98  48 
    Parboiled  % parboiled  89  54  -35 
    Bagging  % packaged  8  45  37       
Price differences 
            Average prices 
            - Mean  BDT/kg  36  55  19  16.39  0.00 
- Median  BDT/kg  32  44 
      Hedonic pricing coefficient*  Modern = 1        1.98  3.75  0.00 
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: * Controlling  for packaging,  variety, parboiled dummy, type of rice, location. 
We thus find that the quality in rice markets in Bangladesh is changing quickly  and that there are 
significant  rewards for quality  of this staple, since fine and medium  rice were valued at two-thirds and 15 
percent higher than coarse rice at the time of the survey. The emerging modern retail sector focuses solely 
on the sales of the higher-quality  rice. Taking into account population  and price levels, it can be estimated 
that because of the price premiums  and the higher consumption  of higher-quality rice, expenditures in 
Dhaka for rice have grown in the last decade by $50 million  annually. However, it is unclear who benefits 
from this increased willingness  to pay for rice quality by urban consumers. To this question we turn next. 
We look  first at the producers (Section 6) and then at the other agents in the chain (Section 7).  
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6.  RICE QUALITY UPSTREAM IN THE VALUE CHAIN 
We start with price information obtained from all commercial rice transactions reported by the 
interviewed farmers in the year prior to the survey. We first present a parsimonious  regression model, 
wherein paddy prices are explained only by quality indicators (Table 6.1). To explore which other 
determinants, on top of the rice quality characteristics, are associated with price formation, we also run a 
long  model that includes characteristics of the transactions as well as of the selling  household.  As could 
be expected, an important determinant of prices is the period when paddy is sold. Prices of paddy that is 
sold at the time of harvest of the important boro crop are BDT 2 to BDT 4 per kilogram  cheaper than 
paddy sold during  the rest of the year. 
Table 6.1—Determinants of paddy prices received by farmers 
Dependent variable=BDT/kg 
 
Parsimonious model  Long model 
   Unit  Coeff.  t-value  Coeff.  t-value 
Quality 
          Coarse rice (default) 
          Medium rice  yes = 1  -1.232  -1.360  -0.790  -0.860 
Fine rice  yes = 1  2.792  2.760  2.017  1.950 
Characteristic transaction 
          Quantity of paddy sold  log(bags) 
 
-1.039  -2.500 
Sold in village   yes = 1 
   
-1.524  -2.710 
Sold in January (default)  yes = 1 
        Sold in February  yes = 1 
   
0.847  1.200 
Sold in April  yes = 1 
   
5.275  4.370 
Sold in July  yes = 1 
   
-2.950  -2.750 
Sold in August  yes = 1 
   
-3.161  -4.520 
Sold in September  yes = 1 
   
-3.325  -3.980 
Sold in October  yes = 1 
   
-2.548  -2.900 
Sold in November  yes = 1 
   
1.271  0.590 
Sold in December  yes = 1 
   
0.002  0.000 
Characteristic household 
          Household head is illiterate  yes = 1 
   
-0.940  -1.340 
Age of head of household  years 
   
0.026  1.260 
Size of household  number 
   
0.213  1.050 
Value of land owned by household  log(BDT) 
   
-0.147  -0.630 
Area of rice cultivated (decimals)  log(dc) 
   
0.131  0.220 
Village dummies 
     
included 
Intercept     13.861  16.060  27.652  5.010 










  Root Mean Squared Error     4.4226     4.0887    
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
Controlling  for other confounding  factors, farmers who sell in  the village  itself obtain a 
significantly  lower price (BDT 1.5 per kilogram)  than those who travel to wholesale markets or mills,  the 
two other major output  channels. This seemingly  reflects at least partly the lower transaction costs 
incurred (Fafchamps and Vargas Hill  2005). None of the household  characteristics that were included in 
the regression turn out to be significant  at conventional statistical levels. Finally,  fine rice paddy is sold at 
a significantly  higher price (of BDT 2.0 per kilogram and BDT 2.8 per kilogram  higher in the long and 
short models, respectively) while there is no significant difference between coarse and medium rice 
paddy. The results thus show that there are some small  price rewards for rice quality,  but they are 
significantly  lower than in urban retail markets. 
Because there might be other rewards aside from prices, we would like to further understand how 
producers benefit from the cultivation  of different qualities. We look at labor and land productivity  and  
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technical efficiency in particular. The unit of observation for further analysis in this section is the plot in a 
particular season. Households in our dataset used on average 4.3 plots toward paddy cultivation  for at 
least one season. However, since most households  cultivate paddy on the same plot  in different seasons, 
the number of observations is significantly  higher:  1,999 plots in total in our dataset, or about 9.1 plots on 
average per household. 
Not all of these paddy plots are as likely  to be used for growing the same quality of rice paddy. 
To explore which factors determine rice paddy quality  choice, we run a multinomial  regression of 
different explanatory variables at the plot as well as the household  level  (Table 6.2). Plots allocated to 
coarse rice paddy are used as the default value in the regression. The results show that in the area studied, 
medium  rice paddy is much less likely to be planted in the aman (rainy) period  than in the boro (dry) 
period, while fine rice paddy is more likely  to be grown in the aman period. Indicators of elevation (such 
as a land level index and usual flood depth) indicate that coarse rice paddy is more likely  to be grown on 
plots that are more prone to flooding.  The characteristics of the households,  on the other hand, show little 
influence on the choice of the quality of rice paddy. The results show that especially the larger 
households,  who are often also poorer, are more likely  to cultivate coarse paddy. 
Table 6.2—Determinants of plots being used for different qualities of rice (multinomial probit) 
Default = coarse rice 
 
Medium  Fine 
Determinants  Unit  Coefficient  z-value  Coefficient  z-value 
Irrigated by shallow tube well  yes = 1 
        Irrigated by low lift pump  yes = 1  -0.087  -0.330  -0.279  -0.890 
Irrigated by deep tube well  yes = 1  -0.624  -5.260  -0.183  -1.390 
Irrigated by other  yes = 1  -1.175  -4.360  -0.923  -2.880 
Area of plot  Log(decimals)  0.142  1.770  0.236  2.610 
Land level  index 1 to 5  0.256  2.370  -0.158  -1.320 
Usual flood depth  foot  0.048  1.070  -0.144  -2.780 
Head of household is illiterate  yes = 1  0.282  1.890  0.220  1.350 
Age of head of household  years  0.003  0.740  -0.005  -1.070 
Total area of rice cultivated  Log(decimals)  0.098  0.840  -0.079  -0.600 
Household size  number  -0.135  -4.120  -0.071  -1.930 
Boro period (default)  yes = 1 
        Aus period  yes = 1  -0.038  -0.220  -0.173  -0.830 
Aman period  yes = 1  -0.537  -4.710  0.321  2.510 
Intercept     0.659  1.070  1.069  1.550 
Number of observations 
 
1999 
      Wald chi-square (24) 
 
194.30 
      Prob > chi-square 
 
0.00 
      Log-likelihood     -1,455.95          
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
Detailed questions were asked for all the rice paddy plots and for each season related to the level 
of output,  input  use (seeds, fertilizer,  chemicals, irrigation,  and manure), use of both family  labor and 
hired labor for different activities (soil preparation, planting,  weeding, harvesting, and other activities), as 
well as technology  adoption. All  inputs and outputs were divided  by the area of the plot,  yielding  a 
measure of the intensity  of use of inputs  and outputs per acre and per unit  of labor. The results, 
distinguished  by rice paddy quality,  are presented in Table 6.3.    
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Table 6.3—Production costs and productivity measures, by quality 
   
Coarse  Medium  Fine 
   
Mean  Mean  t-test vs. coarse  Mean  t-test vs. coarse 
   Unit  value  value  t-value  Pr(T>t)  value  t-value  Pr(T>t) 
Descriptives and t-tests 
                Number of observations 
 
210  1436 
   
353 
    Land productivity  kg/acre  1,727  1,864  -1.72  0.08  1,665  0.64  0.52 
Expected land productivity (before harvest)  kg/acre  2,011  2,366  -2.23  0.02  1,977  0.27  0.78 
Labor productivity  BDT/man-day  318  349  -0.78  0.44  367  -1.27  0.20 
Total monetary input costs  BDT/acre  14,560  16,789  -1.07  0.28  13,755  1.06  0.28 
Total input costs,* of which…  BDT/acre  36,930  35,940  1.48  0.14  35,669  1.48  0.14 
… Ag.  inputs (fertilizer, pesticides, manure)   BDT/acre  9,800  8,634  2.93  0.00  9,050  1.21  0.22 
… Labor   BDT/acre  8,280  8,455  -0.42  0.67  7,768  1.27  0.20 
Nearest-Neighbor Matching (comparing to coarse rice)**  Average treatment effect for the treated (ATT) 
     
Medium versus coarse  Fine versus coarse 
   
   Coeff.  z-value  P>|z|  Coeff.  z-value  P>|z| 
Land productivity  kg/acre 
 
164  1.51  0.13  105  0.89  0.37 
Expected land productivity (before harvest)  kg/acre 
 
352  1.57  0.12  218  1.25  0.21 
Labor productivity  BDT/man-day  44  0.81  0.42  58  1.21  0.22 
Total monetary input costs  BDT/acre 
 
3,646  1.22  0.22  66  0.07  0.94 
Total input costs,* of which…  BDT/acre 
 
833  0.81  0.42  11  0.01  0.99 
… Ag.  inputs (fertilizer, pesticides, manure)   BDT/acre 
 
117  0.19  0.85  -249  -0.31  0.75 
… Labor   BDT/acre     716  1.16  0.25  260  0.53  0.59 
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: *: Valuing all inputs (land, labor, inputs) at market prices, excluding  tractor and animal use; costs of land fixed at BDT 18,850. 
**: Matching variables are type of irrigation, area of plot, land level, usual flood depth, total rice area cultivated, size household, education head of household, household size, 
period of cultivation, village  dummy.    
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Average rice paddy yields in the surveyed district amount to 1.7 tons for coarse rice paddy, 1.9 
tons for medium  rice paddy,  and 1.7 tons for fine rice paddy. These differences are not significant.  All 
labor use, family  as well as hired, was added per plot;  labor per plot  was then divided  by the output per 
plot and then valued at median prices for the particular quality  of paddy. This gave us a measure of labor 
productivity.  Average labor productivity  came to BDT 318 per man-day for coarse rice paddy. This 
compares with BDT 349 and BDT 367 per man-day for medium and fine rice paddy, respectively. None 
of the differences are significant  as measured by a simple  t-test. Two cost measures are also presented: 
total monetary costs as well as total costs valuing all nonpurchased inputs (including  family labor).
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Again, there is little  difference between different rice qualities. 
Because different varieties, linked  to different qualities,  are grown in different seasons,11 on 
different fields, and by different households, a simple comparison between all plots would not be 
appropriate. We thus implement  a nearest-neighbor matching technique,  whereby a treated group (the 
better-quality rice paddy) is compared with a control group (the coarse rice paddy) using matching 
techniques over a multidimensional  set of variables (Abadie et al. 2004). Compared with other matching 
techniques, this method has the advantage of allowing individual  observations to be used as a match more 
than once and therefore generally lowering the bias (but increasing the variance). Using this technique, 
we find again no significant  differences between intensity  of inputs  and labor productivity  over the sets of 
varieties of rice paddy that are linked to the three categories of quality. While growing fine rice paddy is 
slightly  beneficial in the level of price received, comparing similar plots and taking into consideration 
labor requirements and yield levels, it does not lead to higher levels of labor productivity. This finding 
implies  also that shifting to higher-quality  rice paddy has no significant  implications  for input technology 
(fertilizer use, labor use, pesticides, etc.) and that there is seemingly little  costliness in  the shift toward 
higher-quality  rice paddy. 
We further look at the returns on inputs in a production function, so as to evaluate the impact of 
quality on technical efficiency.
12 We do so by running a simple Cobb–Douglas production function (Table 
6.4). We rely on a fixed-effect model in order to reduce the effect of unobservable household 
characteristics. Except for wage labor,  most of the results turn out to be largely significant  at conventional 
statistical levels. The season of production leads to high productivity impacts, with significantly  higher 
productivity  in the boro period, often related to water access and thus production risk. However, 
controlling  for all these inputs  and factors, rice paddy quality—as mirrored by variety—does not act as a 
significant  shifter in the production  function. A change in the quality  of rice paddy grown does not lead to 
a differential  technical efficiency. This lack of any difference in efficiency might  explain  the joint 
cultivation  of the different qualities as well as the lack of large price differences at the producer level, as 
would be expected in well-functioning  output markets. 
   
                                                 
10 The major contributor to input costs is chemical fertilizers. Second comes pesticides and irrigation. Other costs, such as 
those for seed and manure, are relatively minor. Labor requirements are spread out over different activities. The peak 
requirements are at the period of transplanting and of harvesting. About 30 percent of the labor used is family labor while 70 
percent is wage  labor. 
11 Production levels in the aman season are significantly lower for all three types of rice; land productivity drops to 60 
percent of the level in the boro season. 
12 Other authors have looked at this in the Bangladeshi context, such as Balcombe et al. (2007); Hossain, Bose, and Mustafi 
(2006); and Rahman (2003).  
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Table 6.4—Returns to inputs (Cobb-Douglas production function; household fixed-effect model) 
Determinants  Unit  Coefficient  t-value  Mean level 
Production   log(kg) 
   
1,096 
Area cultivated  log(decimals)  0.619  6.18  63 
Own labor  log(days)  0.028  1.87  15 
Wage labor   log(days)  0.045  1.54  40 
Seeds  log(kgs)  0.227  8.05  16 
Fertilizer  log(kg)  0.110  3.76  103 
Pesticides  log(Rs)  0.067  2.92  919 
Manure  log(kg)  0.012  2.86  3,720 
Tractor use  log(number of hours)  -0.018  -0.30  0.35 
Animal use  log(number of hours)  0.070  0.66  12.98 
Land level  index from 1 to 5  -0.036  -1.53  2.92 
Usual flood depth  foot  0.025  1.58  1.42 
Irrigated by shallow tube well  yes = 1 
   
0.43 
Irrigated by low lift pump  yes = 1  -0.139  -1.30  0.05 
Irrigated by deep tube well  yes = 1  0.007  0.10  0.49 
Irrigated by other  yes = 1  -0.004  -0.04  0.03 
Fine rice  yes = 1 
   
0.18 
Medium rice  yes = 1  0.009  0.23  0.72 
Coarse rice  yes = 1  -0.039  -0.67  0.11 
Boro period  yes = 1 
   
0.44 
Aus period  yes = 1  -0.425  -13.20  0.12 
Aman period  yes = 1  -0.395  -18.56  0.43 
Intercept     2.661  4.39    
Number of observations = 1,996 
        R-square:  within  = 0.7482 
        between = 0.8466 
        overall = 0.7880 
        F(18,1762) = 290.59 
        Prob > F = 0             
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
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7.  WHO IN THE VALUE CHAIN BENEFITS FROM THE WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR 
RICE QUALITY? 
The obvious question is, then, if not the producer, who in the value chain benefits from the quality 
premium in retail markets? To study this, we rely on sales price information for all rice varieties, paddy 
varieties, and brands that were for sale at the time of the survey and that were asked for at all  levels in the 
value chain. We do a regression analysis with these sales prices as the dependent variable and with value 
chain agent dummies interacted with coarse, medium, and fine rice paddy dummies as independent 
variables. This methodology  allows for the estimation of quality-specific margins. The results are 
reported in Table 7.1. The sales price of coarse rice at the mill  is the default value in the regression. Most 
results come out as expected, with the reported price of (traditional)  retailers, urban wholesalers, rural 
wholesalers in paddy and rice, and millers following  their respective place in the rural–urban rice value 
chain. 
Table 7.1—Sales price regression of the paddy/rice value chain 
   
Results 
   Unit  Coeff.  t-value 
Intercept 
 
22.88  13.51 
Coarse rice dummy interactions 
      Miller in BDT/kg of rice (default)  yes = 1 
    Rural paddy trader in BDT/kg of paddy  yes = 1  -9.32  -5.41 
Rural rice trader in BDT/kg of rice  yes = 1  -1.71  -1.00 
Urban wholesaler in BDT/kg of rice  yes = 1  1.61  0.93 
Urban retailer in BDT/kg of rice  yes = 1  3.35  1.97 
Medium rice dummy interactions 
      Rural paddy trader in BDT/kg of paddy  yes = 1  -10.28  -12.65 
Rural rice trader in BDT/kg of rice  yes = 1  0.18  0.20 
Urban wholesaler in BDT/kg of rice  yes = 1  2.39  2.83 
Urban retailer in BDT/kg of rice  yes = 1  6.16  7.05 
Medium rice dummy  yes = 1  1.35  0.72 
Fine rice dummy interactions 
      Rural paddy trader in BDT/kg of paddy  yes = 1  -19.05  -5.19 
Rural rice trader in BDT/kg of rice  yes = 1  -1.99  -0.61 
Urban wholesaler in BDT/kg of rice  yes = 1  2.41  0.76 
Urban retailer in BDT/kg of rice  yes = 1  9.52  3.04 
Fine rice dummy  yes = 1  11.52  3.30 
Number of observations 
 
1,064 
  F(17,1360) 
 
482.01 
  Prob > F 
 
0.00 
  R-square 
 
0.56 
  Root Mean Square Error     8.60    
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
To interpret the coefficient in the regression toward the exact price composition  of rice, it is 
important to convert paddy prices correctly to rice equivalents. To do so, we need to better understand 
paddy transformation in the country. In the milling  process, paddy is separated into rice and by-products 
(husks).
13 A rice equivalent represents the quantity of rice obtained from the milling  of a kilogram  of 
                                                 
13 A first important by-product of paddy milling is tuss. For every 100 kilograms of paddy milled,  about 20 kilograms of tuss 
is produced. This could be sold at a price of about BDT 2 per kilogram. However, only a small number of mills do sell this by-
product, since it is mostly used as a fuel for the parboiling  process. A second by-product is kura. For every 100 kilograms of 
paddy, it is estimated that about 15 kilograms of kura is produced. This could be sold at about BDT 5 per kilogram  at the time of 
the survey. This product is generally used as feed for fish, cattle, and poultry. Medium and coarse rice are characterized by 
similar milling  ratios (26 kilograms of rice per maund [40 kilograms] of paddy, or a conversion rate of 0.65). In the case of fine 
rice, this conversion rate is slightly lower, at 25 kilograms per maund, or a conversion ratio of 0.625.  
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paddy. Information on these conversion ratios in the Bangladesh setting was collected through key 
informant interviews.
14 Relying on those estimates, Figure 7.1 shows the price structure at the time of the 
survey for the three rice qualities. It is important to note that in this graph and in the subsequent price 
decomposition  exercise, we do not directly use the producer prices collected in  the farmer survey because 
they represented prices that farmers obtained for their rice over the course of the year and would thus not 
be directly comparable to the prices in the value chain at the time of the survey at the end of 2009. As an 
approximation,  we rely on the reported rural paddy trader sales price, which reflects the sales prices for 
farmers as well a margin  for the rural trader. 
Figure 7.1—Price structure of rice 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
While retail prices are lowest for coarse rice, at BDT 26 per kilogram,  compared with BDT 30 
per kilogram  for medium rice and BDT 43 per kilogram  for fine rice, rural market prices for these three 
rice qualities  differ much less. Rural paddy trader prices at the time of the survey were evaluated at BDT 
13.5 per kilogram,  BDT 13.9 per kilogram,  and BDT 15.3 per kilogram for coarse, medium, and fine 
paddy rice, respectively (or, in rice equivalents, BDT 19.1 per kilogram,  BDT 19.7 per kilogram,  and 
BDT 22.8 per kilogram).
15 The quality premium is thus seemingly largely explained by post-farmgate 
activities. When we compare the relative share of the rural paddy trader price—using  the rice equivalent 
price—in final  retail, this is as high  as 73 percent for coarse rice but drops to 65 percent for medium rice 
and as low as 52 percent for fine rice. The biggest beneficiaries of this increased price for higher-quality 
products are mills  and (traditional) retailers, as shown in Figure 7.1. The figure shows that urban 
wholesale contributes relatively little  to the final price, 6 percent on average. 
While the graph gives us a good indication  of the process, we nevertheless  want to 
understand the quality premium better  quantitatively. We  rely on  a  decomposition technique to 
estimate the relative contributions of different components. The retail price of rice quality  1 can 
be decomposed as follows: 
  𝑃𝑟1 = 𝑐1𝑃𝑝1+ 𝐵1 +∑ 𝑀𝑖1
3
𝑖=1 ,  (1) 
                                                 
14 Similar results have been found in other studies in Bangladesh (Murshid 2001). 
15 The differences in the quality premium at the producer level from the previous section are very similar to the quality 
premiums detected at the rural market level in the value chain regression, and thus they give us further confidence in the 
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where Pr is the retail price of rice, Pp is the producer price of paddy, c is the conversion ratio, B is the 
value of by-products, and M1, M2, and M3 are the margins between rural markets and miller,  between 
miller  and urban wholesaler, and between urban wholesaler and retailer, respectively. To estimate their 
respective contributions  to the price premium, we subtract the price composition  equation of quality 1 
from that of quality 2 (meaning, fine minus coarse and medium  minus coarse) and then divide  that by the 
retail quality premium:  
  1 = ((𝑐2𝑃 𝑝2−𝑐1𝑃𝑝1)+ ∆𝐵 +∑ ∆𝑀𝑖)/ 3
𝑖=1 ∆𝑃 𝑟.  (2) 
Table 7.2 shows the statistical significance of the factors that explain the quality premium. Using 
an F-statistic, only the retail margin is significantly  larger for medium or fine rice compared with coarse 
rice, while  the margin between rural paddy traders and millers  is also significantly  higher in the case of 
fine rice compared with coarse rice. Table 7.2 shows further the results of this decomposition  exercise. 
Two decomposition  methods are used, one not incorporating  the value of by-products (decomposition I), 
the method commonly  used in the literature, and the second incorporating  that value (decomposition  II). 
There is little  difference between the two methods in explaining  the quality  premium  because of the 
relatively  small  change in conversion ratios between qualities. 
Table 7.2—Decomposition of the quality premium (using regression results) 
   Rice quality premium 
 
Medium vs. coarse  Fine vs. coarse 
   F-value  p>F  F-value  p>F 
F-test on differences between qualities 
        Rural paddy trader price  1.28  0.25  0.76  0.38 
Rural paddy trader/miller margin  0.25  0.61  5.76  0.02 
Miller-urban wholesaler margin  0.16  0.68  0.05  0.82 
Urban wholesaler/urban retailer margin  11.48  0.00  19.47  0.00 
 
BDT/kg  %  BDT/kg  % 
Decomposition I*# 
        Rural paddy trader price  0.60  14.4  3.70  20.9 
Rural paddy trader/miller margin  0.75  18.0  7.82  44.2 
Miller-urban wholesaler margin  0.78  18.8  0.81  4.6 
Urban wholesaler/urban retailer margin  2.03  48.8  5.36  30.3 
Total  4.16  100.0  17.69  100.0 
Decomposition II**# 
        Rural paddy trader price  0.60  14.4  3.62  20.5 
Value of by-products  0.00  0.0  0.08  0.4 
Rural paddy trader/miller margin  0.75  18.0  7.82  44.2 
Miller-urban wholesaler margin  0.78  18.8  0.81  4.6 
Urban wholesaler/urban retailer margin  2.03  48.8  5.36  30.3 
Total  4.16  100.0  17.69  100.0 
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
The analysis illustrates the increasing importance of the off-farm segments with increasing rice 
quality. The results show that the quality  premium (over coarse rice) increases from BDT 4.2 per 
kilogram  to BDT 17.7 per kilogram  in the case of medium and fine rice, respectively. The increase in the 
quality premium is only to a very minor extent explained by increased producer prices (14 percent and 20 
percent in the case of medium and fine rice, respectively). The largest explanation  is the increase of rural 
trader–miller margins (44 percent and 18 percent of the premium for medium and fine, respectively) and 
the urban retail margin (49 percent and 30 percent for medium and fine, respectively).  
20 
An important question is why these margins differ significantly  between the low- and high-
quality rice. First, it can be argued that the milling  of higher-quality  rice entails higher costs. On the one 
hand, conversion ratios from fine paddy to fine rice are seemingly lower than the ratios for medium or 
coarse rice, as indicated  by several millers.  This then leads to a higher level  of lower-valued by-products 
and higher costs for milling  of fine rice. On the other hand, a specific quality of paddy does not lead to a 
specific quality  of rice. Double—or more—milling  processes (as well as parboiling)  can allow for the 
production of fine rice out of medium paddy, or of medium rice out of coarse paddy. For example, the 
widely available Minicate variety in Bangladeshi markets (19 percent of the reported quality in the 
portfolio  for sale by Dhaka retailers) comes mostly not from a fine paddy variety (since fine paddy is 
rarely produced locally)  but from a medium paddy variety that has been double milled  so that it becomes 
fine rice. In this case, the level of by-products is again higher  than in the case of single  milling.  On top of 
the lower conversion ratio, there is also the extra cost of the milling  (and parboiling)  operation itself that 
has to be accounted for. Some millers  are willing  to bear these extra costs because of the increasing price 
premium,  as was seen in Figure 5.1. 
To test whether that process was happening in the zones where our survey was fielded, we 
compare the importance in the portfolio  of the different qualities of rice in procurement and sales, and we 
test whether the grade millers  bought  was lower than the grade they sold (Table 7.3). However, no 
significant  difference can be detected, and it seems that this practice is little  present in the production 
areas where the millers were interviewed. Overall, it thus seems the case that the higher milling  margins 
might  partly reflect extra costs. In practice, however, we are unable to test for higher costs versus higher 
profit rates that might  be driving  the margin. 
Table 7.3—Procurement of paddy and sales of rice by mills in the year prior to the survey 
 
% in portfolio  t-test difference 
 
Years  Mean 
     Procurement  Sales  difference  t-value  Pr(T>t) 
Coarse 
          Aman  43.9  44.7  0.8  0.32  0.75 
Boro  37.9  42.3  4.4  2.08  0.05 
Medium 
   
  
    Aman  26.3  24.7  -1.6  -0.32  0.75 
Boro  36.4  36.7  -0.3  -0.12  0.91 
Fine 
   
  
    Aman  29.7  30.5  0.8  0.14  0.89 
Boro  25.4  21.3  -4.2  -1.73  0.10 
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
Second, an important change in retail in Asia is the rapid emergence of brands (Minten, Reardon, 
and Chen 2011). For example, the mill  operators in our sample indicated that the share of packaged rice 
(sold in bags smaller than 50 kilograms and often reflecting branding) had increased from 5 percent to 36 
percent in their portfolio  in the last decade. This branding practice is significantly  more prevalent for 
medium and fine rice in Dhaka retail markets than for coarse rice, as shown by the results of a probit 
model in Table 7.4. The higher prices obtained by rice mills  and retailers might thus partly be explained 
by brand values created by the mills  (for example, as discussed in general for developing  countries by 
Anholt 2005). The rewards of these brands are captured downstream in the value chain—by the mills  as 
well as possibly by retailers. 
Third, there is a much larger diversity of agronomic varieties within  the fine and, to a lesser 
extent, the medium  rice category than there is in the category of coarse rice, and millers do not just sell a 
quality (such as coarse, medium, or fine) but often differentiate further by brand and variety. Given the 
lower turnover of these products compared with a less differentiated product such as coarse rice (for 
example, as seen in the larger share of coarse grains in total sales, shown in Table 4.2, compared with 
their share in the total portfolio  of the retailer, shown in Table 5.1), the opportunity  costs for retailers (and  
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mills)  of holding  stocks of better-quality rice might possibly be higher. This might then also partly 
explain the higher observed retail margins. Since this point was made only in key informant interviews 
and could not be verified with our data, this explanation  deserves further research. 
Table 7.4—Branding and rice quality (probit regression of sales of branded rice in Dhaka retail 
markets) 
 
Unit  Coefficient  z-value  Marginal 
  
     
effect* 
Coarse rice (default) 
        Medium rice  yes = 1  0.92  1.97  0.089 
Fine rice  yes = 1  1.47  3.29  0.033 
Modern retail  yes = 1  2.23  9.13  0.065 
Thana dummies  yes = 1  included 
Intercept     -2.18  -4.88    
Number of observations 
 
944 
    Likelihood ratio chi-square(11) 
 
274.36 
    Prob > chi-square 
 
0 
    Pseudo R-square     0.3374       
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
Note: * Change in the probability for a discrete change in the independent variable. 
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8.  CONCLUSIONS 
The impact of the changing demand for food quality  and safety on food systems in developing countries 
is not yet well understood. Most of the existing  literature has looked  at the impact of modern channels 
(export markets or modern retail) and has mostly focused on their effects on producers or solely on 
nonstaple products. While previous  research has shown the decline of rice as a staple food in Asian 
markets (for example, Timmer 2010), little  research has been done on the change within  the rice sector 
itself. We look at the case of rice in Bangladesh and study changes in rice quality,  based on unique 
surveys fielded at different levels of the value chain: upstream, midstream, and downstream. Two major 
findings emerge. 
First, the share of higher-quality  rice is found in our survey to be rapidly increasing in rice 
markets. This type of rice is sold in traditional  urban retail markets at significantly  higher prices than the 
lower-quality coarse rice. The emerging modern retail sells it at even higher prices. It is interesting that 
we find such a shift in one of the poorest countries in Asia. 
Second, the labor rewards for growing high- and low-quality  rice are found not to be significantly 
different. Farmers thus currently do not benefit directly from these relatively higher retail prices and from 
consumers’ increased willingness  to pay for food quality. In a well-functioning  agricultural economy, one 
would expect farmers to be paid for the extra effort to produce quality,  but one would expect not to find 
larger returns on the production  of higher-quality  versus lower-quality  rice if efforts and inputs were 
similar.  The latter seems to be the case in Bangladesh. 
The findings  point  to several implications.  First,  the availability  of higher-yielding  varieties of 
better-quality rice and the increasing demand for quality in rice markets have led to important push and 
pull factors that have together led to important changes in the rice sector in Bangladesh. This situation 
illustrates how well-targeted rice variety improvements that respond to needs can have large impacts on 
agricultural economies in such countries. 
Second, the lack of availability  of high-yielding  varieties of the highest-quality  (fine) rice leads to 
important costs in the rice value chain, resulting from the conversion of low paddy quality to high rice 
quality. If higher-yielding  varieties of fine rice were more readily available,  it seems that farmers, if not 
directly then at least indirectly,  should  be able to capture a larger share of consumers’ increasing 
willingness  to pay for quality,  and these varieties would then also become available at lower prices for 
consumers. The resulting  price decreases at the end of the value chain might then also make Bangladesh 
more competitive in rice export markets. 
The research also points  to important  new areas for research. First, a better understanding  of the 
growing off-farm sector, of the way the availability  of new technologies  within processing industries 
leads to a transformation of value chains, and of the rewards of adoption and spread of these new 
technologies  is a fertile area for further research. Second, while the present study is based on relatively 
small surveys, it would be useful to better understand the implications  of the transformation of food value 
chains based on larger surveys within Bangladesh as well as in other countries. Third, we rely solely on 
cross-sectional data. It would  be beneficial  to better grasp changes over seasons and over longer time 
periods by relying on consistently collected household data over time. Fourth, more research is needed to 
unravel the exact importance of the different drivers in the transformation of food value chains, such as 
changing preferences of the poor versus income growth overall.  
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